H.R.885
International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007
(5) The financing and construction of additional uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in additional states around the world is indefensible on economic grounds alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing services to the world market.
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries, therefore, is often based upon considerations other than economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration to the world that the country that possesses this technology has arrived at a level of technological development comparable to that of the United States and other countries with advanced civil nuclear power programs.
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a demonstration of the developing world's independence from technological domination by the more developed states. Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an `inalienable right ...to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.'. However, this is a qualified right conditioned by a State Party's acting in conformity with the NPT's obligation for such countries not to acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
(8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments, nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for decades recognized the need to address this problem through multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to develop and construct such facilities themselves.
(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new urgency.
(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.
(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities.
(12) The United States also joined France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, in proposing a `Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel' that would facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and recipients to provide fuel to countries with good nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on February 11, 2004, that `The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing.'.
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international management and oversight, as part of a `Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure' proposal to create international nuclear fuel cycle centers.
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities and are committed to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

paleocon wrote:Well, that "oil for food" thing turned out alright in Iraq, didn't it?  And the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is going like gangbusters since it was established in 1968.  If not, rogue countries like North Korea, India and Pakistan would almost certainly have the bomb by now.  

And think of where human rights would be if we didn't have the UN Charter.  I mean, thankfully that protects freedom of conscience in places as diverse as China, Russia, Viet Nam, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran.  Thanks to the UN Charter citizens of those states enjoy the same basic freedoms as do we here in the US!  

Thank Gaia and the goddesses for the UN!

paleocon wrote:I thought his name was spelled "Coffee Anonymous."  Are we talking about the same guy?  He was special.  I think they have made in a saint in Rwanda and Iraq.  He is be the patron saint of smugglers and murderers.  I hear Serbia is thinking about making him a saint as well.  I wonder if his son will help with this process like he did in "Oil for Palaces" in Iraq?